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ABSTRACT
To help practitioners effectively implement security programs, we explored the interrelationship between security objectives
and practices by conducting a canonical analysis based on the data from 354 certified security professionals. We found that
for moderately information-sensitive organizations, “Confidentiality” had the highest correlation with information security
practices.  In these organizations, the security practice contributing most to the security objectives was “Access Control”.
For highly information-sensitive organizations, the “Confidentiality”, “Accountability,” and “Integrity” together determine
the security practices.  In these organizations, the major security practices that impact on security objectives are: “Access
Control”, “Organizational Security”, and “Security Policy”.  “Access Control” was the only practice contributing to
information security objectives in both groups. The items in this dimension focused mainly on technical controls.
Keywords
Information security management, Objectives, Practices, Inter-relationships, Survey, Information security professionals,
Canonical correlation analysis.
INTRODUCTION
Information security management (ISM) should be conceptualized as a process. The process starts with information security
objectives. The security objectives should be set by top management, which should dictate the security infrastructure and be
aligned with business strategy.  Then, various kinds of security controls should be implemented to enforce the security
objectives.   Although ISM is  a  business  case-based decision,  and the  “best  practices” in  one  organization  may not  be  the
“best practices” for another organization, there are strong similarities between good security programs at a strategic level that
can be analyzed and emulated to improve the security of most organizations (Bachman 2002).  These strategies imply a
number of tactics that are widely – but not universally – applicable. Recently, security professionals and organizations are
making efforts to formulate these patterns.
Some researchers recognized that the relationships between security objectives and practices are complicated, but important
for practitioners to understand (Dhillon and Torkzadeh 2001). Also some practices only contribute to a particular security
objective (Byrnes and Procter 2002).   Thus, it is important to explore the underlying relationships between management
practices and information security objectives. Knowledge of how the practices interact and influence the information security
objectives, which practice contributes to which information security objective(s), how much each of the management
practices contributes to the total security goal, and how to maximize information security objectives, are important for
managers to understand in resource allocation and diagnostics.
In this study, we investigate the relationship between information security objectives and practices by conducting a canonical
analysis based on the data from 354 certified security professionals.  We found that for moderately information-sensitive
organizations, “Confidentiality” had the highest correlation with information security practices.  In these organizations, the
security practice contributing most to the security objectives was “Access Control”.  For highly information-sensitive
organizations, the “Confidentiality”, “Accountability,” and “Integrity” determine the security practices.  In this group of
organizations, the major security practices that impact on information security objectives are: “Access Control”,
“Organizational Security”, and “Security Policy”.  “Access Control” was the only practice which contributed to information
security objectives in both groups. The items in this dimension focused mainly on technical controls.
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LITERATURE REVIEW
Leiwo and Zheng (1997) categorized the duties of managerial information security personnel as upper boundary and lower
boundary.  Upper boundary duties are the formulation of information security requirements based on information security
objectives, which are based on different national/international laws, agreements, standards, and organizational business
objectives.   They  are  set  by  top  management  and  formulated  in  an  unambiguous  way.   Lower  boundary  duties  are  the
specification of technical security policies based on top management security requirements.  They include the security
enforcement mechanisms implemented by technical personnel. Based on this upper-lower boundary perspective, information
security objectives should be strategic and at higher level.
Generally, information security professionals agree that the objective of information system security is to optimize the
performance of an organization with respect to the risks to which it is exposed (Bosworth and Kabay, 2002).  Information
security is concerned with protecting the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information and information systems
(Fried, 1994; Blackwell, 1998).  Therefore, the goal of ISM is to ensure business continuity, customer confidence,
competitive advantage, protect business investments and opportunities, and reduce damage to the business by preventing and
minimizing the impact of security incidents.  Besides the three traditional information security objectives— confidentiality,
integrity, and availability, more components of security objectives were suggested.  A review of IS literature reveals that non-
repudiation, authentication, accountability/auditability are three new objectives that are most often cited in current
information security literature (Ma 2004).
The complex relationships between the means and ends in ISM not only indicate that both security practices and security
objectives are multi-dimensional, but also interact with each other.  The implementation of one security objective can impact
the implementation of another objective.  For example, risk-analysis is used by some organizations as a security objective.  In
another organization, it might be used as the means by which to identify controls for information security management.
Similarly, the items listed in ISO 17799 were regarded as evaluation criteria by Dhillon and Backhouse (2001), but many
security professionals consider these items to be the security practices necessary to achieve specific security objectives.
Researchers and practitioners indicated that some practices only contribute to a particular security objective.  For example,
the relationship between access control and confidentiality was described by Byrnes and Procter (2002) as:
“To accomplish the confidentiality objective requires that we know what data we are protecting and who
should have access to it. It requires that we provide protection mechanisms for the data while it is stored in
the computer and while it is being transferred over networks between computers. We will need to know the
application programs that we use (or could use) to manipulate the data and control the use of those
applications. Luckily, the Chief Security Officer (CSO) and the IT team will handle the mechanics of doing
all this—just as soon as we tell them how to figure out who should have access to which data and
applications and how far to go in providing confidentiality”.
Surprisingly, very few studies have concentrated on the relationship between information security objectives and practices.
Dhillon and Torkzadeh (2001) did an exploratory study in which they used a value-focused thinking approach and
interviewed 73 managers in a cross section of firms from various industries.  They identified 9 fundamental objectives and 16
methods or practices that are essential to accomplishing those objectives in protecting a firm’s information resources.  In the
framework they proposed, there was an interaction between these methods and fundamental objectives.  Although their
model provides insights into the understanding of interrelationships between the means (management practices) and the
security objectives, its complexity makes it difficult for managers to follow, and therefore it needs to be improved.  First, the
terms used in the original model were confusing.  Dhillon and Torkzadeh used “mean objectives” for the methods to be used,
and “fundamental objectives” for objectives to be achieved.  Second, they did not tell how the practices interact and influence
the information security objectives, which practice contributes to which information security objective, how much each of the
management practices contributes to the total security goal, and how to maximize information security objectives.  Such
knowledge is important for managers in resource allocation and diagnostics. Third, the model is too general to be effective.
They did not specify the scenario in which the model can be applied.  ISM is complex and many factors are involved.  For
example, organizational size is considered an important barometer of IT security's effectiveness (Briney and Prince 2002),
and not all organizations are equally impacted by the problems of information security since the risk profile of companies
differs across industries (Pelter 2003). Thus, we believe the study of the relationship based cluster analysis will provide
deeper understanding, more meaningful interpretation, and more practical suggestions.
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RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
To map the interrelationship between management practices and security objectives, a canonical correlation analysis method
was used. Canonical correlation analysis is one of the most widely used methods to predict or explain a set of dependent
variables with a set of independent variables.  In this study, we proposed that organizations should set objectives first and
based on the objectives selected, appropriate practices should be developed and enforced.  Thus, the factors derived from
information security objectives were treated as independent variables, while those generated from information security
practices were considered as dependent variables (Table 1).  This study is part of larger project, in which a factor analysis
identified four dimensions for information security objectives: Information Integrity, Confidentiality, Accountability, and
Availability; another factor analysis identified eight factors for security practices (Ma and Pearson 2005).
Information Security Objectives
(Independent)
Information Security Practices
(Dependent)
Integrity
Accountability
Confidentiality
Availability
Security Policy
Organizational Security
Asset Classification
Continuity
Access Control
System Development
Operations
External Security
Table 1. Variables in the Canonical Analysis
Our sample for this study comes primarily from the website of the International Information Systems Security Certificate
Consortium (ISC)2, a not-for-profit consortium and certification organization.  Utilizing the search capability of the directory
provided on this website, we were able to obtain the contact information for certified information security professionals who
reside within the United States of America.  The data was collected via a web-based survey. The response rate was 11.8
percent, and 354 responses were used in this study. A majority of the respondents are male.  17.2 percent of respondents were
under  30  years  of  age,  while  46.4  percent  were  over  the  age  of  40.   It  is  also  interesting  to  note  that  almost  half  of  the
respondents (47%) have received graduate level education. Compared to other information technology professionals, this is
high.  According to a study of 436 SQL server professionals (Pinnacle Publishing, 2003), only 14 percent of the respondents
had graduate level education.   Approximately 75 percent of certified information security professionals had six or more years
of work experience, while only 53 percent of SQL server professionals had this level of experience.  Over half of the
respondents in this study are in management positions.  Most work for small and medium size businesses. Approximately
23% work in financial institutions, healthcare or insurance companies, while many of the remaining respondents (over 60%)
placed their organizations in the unclassified category.
Based on these four dimensions of information security objectives, organizations were clustered into two distinct groups (Ma
2004). Although we proposed that organizations could be classified into three groups (or clusters) in terms of information
sensitivity— low, medium, and high, the cluster analysis resulted in two distinct types of organizations. This could be
explained partly by the relatively low number of organizations which participated in this study that would be considered
information insensitive.  Apparently, respondents came mainly from medium information-sensitive and high information-
sensitive organizations.  The intuitive explanation for this would be that, since this study targeted information security
professionals, organizations that don’t perceive organization information as important or sensitive, probably would not feel a
need to have these types of information technology professionals on their staff. We did additional t-tests on the demographic
information for each cluster.  Statistically, there was no significant difference on gender, education, position, and number of
personal computers within the organizations.  However, the clusters did differ significantly on age of the information security
professional, business size, and years of work-experience involving information security professionals. The demographics
indicated that organizations in cluster 1 were smaller in size.  The results imply that the organizations which were moderately
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information sensitive were smaller and had younger information security professionals with less work experience, while
organizations dealing with higher levels of information-sensitivity were larger firms and had older, more experienced
information security professionals.
Canonical Correlation Analysis for Cluster 1
In this study, a canonical correlation analysis was conducted for each of the clusters. In the canonical analysis, the factor
variables rather than the item variables were used. This has several advantages. First, it avoids the risk of potentially
misleading results by selecting specific items to represent a complex result. Second, it avoids the difficulty for calculating a
summed scale when two or more item loadings are significant and fairly close to each other.  Conceptually, a summated scale
is a composite value. In this study, the calculation of composite score used a weighted-average of factor loading approach.
The weights for each factor variable correspond to their factor loadings. Since the purpose of cluster analysis is to cluster the
organization based on the similarity distance or distinctiveness of variables, the relationship among those item variables must
be orthogonal.  Therefore, the factor loadings from varimax, not from oblique rotated method were used in calculation of the
composite scales.  For example, if a factor has three items (I1, I2, and I3) and their factor loadings are .756, .701, and .674
respectively, the formula used to compute the composite scale for this factor is: (Item1*.756 + Item2*.701 + Item3*.674)/3.
Canonical analysis is sensitive to sample size and the number of cases in each cluster was not equally distributed, the ratio of
cases to composite variables was examined for each cluster.  Table 2 shows that the ratios of dependent and independent
variables exceed the recommended guideline of 10 observations per variable (Hair et al. 1998).
Cluster Number of Cases Independent (4) Dependent (8)
1
2
158
196
39.5
49
19.75
24.5
Table 2.  Ratio of Cases to Variables
Canonical correlation analysis shares the same basic assumptions as other multivariate analysis techniques such as multiple
regression, discriminant analysis, and factor analysis.    Since there are two sets of variables in canonical analysis, it is
necessary to test the assumptions related to linearity and normality for each set.  For example, when linearity was tested for
the independent variable set (information security objectives), one of the four composite variables was randomly chosen as a
dependent variable, using the other three as independent variables. Then, the appropriate scatter plots were drawn.  Visually
inspection of these the graphs of scatter plots, we did not find nonlinear relationships between the selected dependent variable
and the other independent variables.  In the evaluation of normality, univariate normality was performed by visually checking
the histogram of residuals of each variable in both independent and dependent variable sets. Based on this analysis, it was
determined that the data distribution for the variables was normal.  We also examined the statistical values for kurtosis and
skewness. These values ranged from .18 to 1.38 and .135 to 1.58 respectively. Both are lower than the critical value of 1.96
(Hair et al. 1998).
The process of canonical analysis in this study follows three steps.  The first step in canonical correlation analysis is to derive
canonical functions.  The second step is to interpret these functions. The last step is to test the stability of these functions.
In order to select the appropriate function(s) for interpretation, three criteria were used: 1) statistical significance, 2)
magnitude of relationships, and 3) redundancy measure of shared variance.  With these three steps, only one significant
canonical function was identified for cluster 1.  Its canonical correlation .975; its canonical R-square is .950; and its
redundancy indices of the independent variate and dependent variate are approximately .335 and .140 respectively. No
guidelines have been established for the minimum acceptable redundancy index.  In a study exploring the relationship
between flexible IT infrastructure and competitive advantage, Byrd and Turner (2001) indicated that explaining 20% of the
variance was significant in an organization level study.  That means, 33.5% of total variation in independent variate can be
explained by dependent variables (security practices), and 14% of total variation in dependent variate can be explained by
independent variable (security objectives).  Since, we assume that the establishment of information security practices should
be based on information security objectives, we focus mainly on the redundancy index of the independent variate.  Similarly,
examination of the redundancy indices of the second canonical function indicated that both dependent and independent
variates were less than 5%, indicating that it should not be considered in the analysis.
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Traditionally, canonical weights and canonical loadings have been used to interpret canonical functions. However, these two
approaches have been criticized because the canonical weights can be unstable, particularly in instances where
multicollinearity is a problem, and canonical loadings can experience significant variability from one sample to another, thus
making interpretation difficult between samples.  Alternatively, canonical cross-loadings have recently been suggested as a
viable approach. Canonical cross-loadings involve correlating each of the original observed dependent variables directly with
the independent canonical variate, and vice versa.  It provides a more direct measure of the dependent-independent variable
relationship (Hair et al. 1998).
Canonical cross loadings demonstrate the strength of the linear correlation between each security objective and the dependent
variate (security practices) or between each security practice and the independent variate (security objectives). By looking at
the canonical cross-loadings, the contribution of each independent variable (information security objective) to the dependent
variate (information security practice) can be estimated.  In this study, canonical cross-loadings were used to interpret the
contributions of each variable in each variate in explaining the opposite variate.  However, for comparison purposes, the
canonical weights and canonical loadings are also presented in Table 3.
Variate/
Variables
Canonical Weights
(Standardized)
Canonical
Loadings
Canonical
Cross-Loadings
Independent Variables – Information Security Objectives
Integrity
Accountability
Confidentiality
Availability
.143
-.014
.952
-.009
.473
.444
.991
.091
.461
.433
.966
.089
Dependent Variables - Information Security Practices
Security Policy
Organizational Security
Asset Classification
Continuity
Access Control
System Development
Operations
External Security
-.019
.026
-.005
-.051
1.001
-.028
-.073
.034
.171
.219
.164
.079
.997
.216
.160
-.032
.167
.214
.160
.077
.972
.211
.156
-.031
Table 3.  Canonical Weights for the First Canonical Function in Cluster 1
From Table 3, the contribution of each dependent variable (information security practice) to the independent variate
(information security objectives) can be estimated and vice versa. The influence of dependent variables on the independent
variate comes mainly from “Access Control”.  The other dependent variables contribute very little to the independent variate.
While, the influence of independent variables on the dependent variate comes mainly from “Confidentiality”, “Integrity” and
“Accountability” provide moderate impact, and “Availability” provides almost no impact.  To determine the stability of the
canonical results, sensitivity analysis was conducted.  One method recommended by Hair et al. (1998) is to estimate multiple
canonical correlations by removing a different independent or dependent variable from the analysis.    In this study, four
(Security Policy, Asset Classification, Continuity, System Development) of the eight dependent variables were deleted one at
a  time.   The  results  indicated  that  the  canonical  loadings  for  Cluster  1  were  very  stable  and consistent  in  each of  the  four
cases where an independent variable was deleted. The overall canonical correlations also remained stable.
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CANONICAL CORRELATION ANALYSIS for CLUSTER 2
Following the same procedures as described previously, canonical correlation analysis was conducted for Cluster 2.    Similar
to the results obtained in Cluster 1, two canonical functions were statistically significant with p-value of less than 0.05.  The
test statistics (Pillais, Hotellings, Wilks) for the overall model fit indicated that the canonical functions, taken collectively, are
statistically significant at the 0.001 level..Only one canonical function has significant canonical correlation and significant
reduuncy indices.  Its Canonical Correlation is .920; its canonical R-square is .847 and redundancy indices for the dependent
variate is .332, which is adequate according to the .20 level suggested by (Byrd and Turner 2001).  For the second function,
the dependent and independent variable sets have low shared variance (.027).  Thus, based on the results of the redundancy
analysis and the statistical significance tests, only the first function was considered in further analysis.
Based on the size of the three values, the importance of dependent variables and independent variables can be identified.
First, the contribution of dependent variables (security practices) to the independent variate is mainly from “Access Control”,
and a small portion comes from “Organizational Security” and “Security Policy”. The other variables only have marginal
correlation with the independent variate.  The impact of the independent variables on the dependent variate comes mainly
from “Confidentiality” and “Accountability”. The importance order of their contribution is “Confidentiality”,
“Accountability”, “Integrity”, and “Availability”.
The result of the sensitivity analysis in Cluster 2 indicated that the canonical cross-loadings for Cluster 2 are stable and
consistent in each of the four cases when a dependent variable (Security Policy, Organizational Security, Continuity, or
Access Control) was deleted. The overall canonical correlations also remained stable.
Summary of Statistical Analyses
To have a better understanding of the contribution of each factor to their respective variate, the standardized canonical
weights were sorted and presented in Table 4.
Cluster 1 Cluster 2
Canonical cross-loadings Canonical cross-loadings
Independent Variables
Confidentiality
Integrity
Accountability
Availability
.966
.461
.433
.089
Independent Variables
Confidentiality
Accountability
Integrity
Availability
0.865
0.556
0.470
0.224
Dependent Variables
Access Control
Organizational Security
System Development
Security Policy
Asset Classification
Operations
Continuity
Business Partner Security
.972
.214
.211
.167
.160
.156
.077
-.031
Dependent Variables
Access Control
Organizational Security
Security Policy
Asset Classification
Operations
System Development
Continuity
Business Partner Security
0.912
0.397
0.322
0.270
0.265
0.251
0.186
0.148
Table 4.  Contribution Order of Variables
The results from the canonical correlation analysis revealed that for the first group (Cluster One), “Confidentiality” had the
highest correlation with information security practices. The most important contributor to information security objectives was
“Access Control”.  For the second group of organizations (Cluster Two), the major information security objectives were
“Confidentiality”, “Accountability”, and “Integrity”.  Different from Cluster 1, besides the major contributor “Access
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Control”, “Organizational Security” and “Security Policy” also contributed to the information security objectives.  Based on
the results of this study, “Access Control” is the most important information security practice in both groups.
Based on Table 4, the importance of each security practice in their correspondent function was displayed in Figure 1. In the
diagram, MSO stands for moderately information-sensitive organizations and HSO is for high information-sensitive
organizations.
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Figure 1.  The Importance of Each Security Practice for Different Clusters
IV. Discussion
The canonical correlation analysis “Access Control” was the only practice which contributed to information security
objectives in both groups. The items in this factor focused mainly on technical controls.  These controls are easy to
implement. In the information non-sensitive organizations (e. g. manufacturing) where information security expertise is
typically lacking, implementation of technical oriented “access control” is economical and thus, the first option that should be
selected. However, in information sensitive organizations, security has generally become institutionalized into the corporate
culture via policies (Briney and Prince 2002). It is recognized that information security is more of a “human” problem rather
than pure technical problem. The human related problems are on all levels of the organization — from uninformed end users
to ambivalent upper management.  Although technical controls (such as firewalls, anti-virus, and auditing measures) are easy
to be implemented, they are not sufficient to ensure the achievement of multiple information security objectives. This was
confirmed by the following quote provided by an “experienced” information security professional:
Technical control measures only go so far.  The key to information systems security is user buy-in to the measures to be
taken.  This can only be accomplished through senior management support and proper education of the users of the
information system(s) in question.
 The analysis also found that to have more effective security practices, practitioners should pay attention to “Organizational
Security” and “Security Policies”. This finding has special practical significance because information or computer security is
typically an afterthought, it can be hard to change the culture of an organization to accept information security practices.  It
takes time, effort, and compromise and painful experiences for an organization to learn to establish the policies, and to
enforce these policies.
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This finding is consistent with that of previous studies.  Straub and Welke (1998) proposed a security planning model for
management, which includes countermeasure analysis and education/training in security awareness. For example, they
proposed that security policies not only provide guidelines for proper system use such as password management, but also
convince potential abuser that it is too risky to violate the rules.  However this approach is passive because it depends wholly
on the willingness of system users to follow the policies.  Instead, preventive measures such as access control are active
countermeasures.
Last, the canonical analysis indicated that “Business Partner Security” is the least important among the eight security
practices. This may be because currently, information sharing across organizations is still at a relatively low level.
Researchers (Kauffman and Mohtadi 2003; Kinsey and Ashman 2000) found that information sharing is not fair to different
parties in the supply chain. Usually it was initiated by suppliers because of business strategy, and buyers had less benefited
from this initiative. Also information sharing must be based on trust and insufficient trust generally deters buyers from
sharing critical information with their suppliers.  At present, the majority of electronic information exchange typically occurs
within an organization. With the development of electronic commerce and more frequent business coordination, the
importance of this practice may increase.
V. CONCLUSION
Although the relationship between information security objectives and practices is complex and very few studies have
focused on it in the ISM literature, it is very important for information security practitioners to understand because such
knowledge allows them to take the appropriate management intervention to improve the effectiveness of ISM. The
importance of such studies also lies in that they investigate the security issues from a dynamic and holistic perspective,
following a basic cause-effect logic. Dhillon and Torkzadeh (2001) conducted their study using qualitative method based on
interviews. Different from their study, this study examined the relationship using quantitative approach based on survey.
More important, this study explored the relationship for different cluster of organizations. Since organizations facing
different threats and have different security profiles, in order to provide specific and applicable suggestions, such cluster
analysis is necessary and helpful.
Future study should be cluster-based as organizations in the same cluster often share similar security profiles. The possible
factors can be used for cluster analysis include security objectives, organizational size, industry, or information sensitivity.
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